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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GERARD COTERO J. LOPEZ,
Petitioner,
v.
Case No. 900484-CA
Priority No. 2

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent.

INTRODUCTION
On March 2, 1992, this Court issued its opinion in
State v. Lopez. Case No. 900484-CA (Utah App. March 2, 1992).
A copy of the slip opinion, which contains both a majority and
concurring and dissenting opinions, is attached to this petition in
Appendix A.
Mr. Lopez requests rehearing of this case.

See Brown v.

Pickard, 11 P. 512 (Utah 1886) (explaining circumstances allowing
rehearing); Cumminas v. Nielson, 129 P. 619 (Utah 1913) (same).

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THIS COURT SHOULD ASSUME THAT THE
TRIAL JUDGE MADE FINDINGS IN ACCORDANCE WITH
HIS CONCLUSION THAT THIS WAS A PRETEXT STOP AND
AFFIRM THE ORDER SUPPRESSING EVIDENCE.
Both the majority and concurring and dissenting opinions
fail to consider the oral findings made by the trial judge during
the hearing, fail to give the required deference to the trial judge,
and fail to make the required assumption that the judge made

findings of fact in accordance with his decision.

See Lopez.

slip op. at 11, 16-17, 19-27.
It is well established that the trial court sits in an
advantaged position for purposes of making factual findings and that
his findings must be given deference.
P.2d 1255, 1258 and n.5 (Utah 1987).

See, e.g.. State v. Ashe. 745
In addition,

in cases in which factual issues are presented
to and must be resolved by the trial court but
no findings of fact appear in the record, we
"assume that the trier of facts found them in
accord with its decision, and we affirm the
decision if from the evidence it would be
reasonable to find facts to support it."
State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 787 (Utah 1991) (emphasis added).
At the end of footnote 6 in Ramirez. the Utah Supreme Court included
a string cite listing several Utah cases which support the
proposition that the appellate court "upholds the trial court even
if it failed to make findings on the record whenever it would be
reasonable to assume that the court actually made such findings."
Id. at 788 n.6.
In the lead opinion, rather than giving deference to the
trial judge and assuming that his findings were in accordance with
his conclusion, this Court looks at the testimony in the light most
favorable to the State.

However, the trial judge ruled against the

State in this case, and facts must therefore be resolved in
accordance with his ruling.

For instance, this Court stated:

The officer testified he stopped defendant's
car because he believed defendant was Cruz,
believed defendant was driving without a
license and because he saw defendant make a
turn without signaling.

- 2

s u p op. at ll.
While the officer did testify to this effect, he also
testified regarding his background and exposure to "Cruz" and his
location when he observed the car.

The trial judge implicitly

found, based on the officer's testimony, that any belief that the
driver of the car was Jose Cruz was not reasonable and explicitly
found that the officer relied on erroneous information in forming
this belief.

T. 35-6, 28.

The trial judge made a written finding that Mr. Lopez had
not represented himself to the officer as Jose Cruz.

R. 28. While

Officer Hamner testified at one point that Mr. Lopez had introduced
himself as Jose Cruz, he later clarified that Mr. Lopez had been
pointed out to him.

T. 23, 24. Under such circumstances, a finding

that Mr. Lopez had not introduced himself to the officer was not
clearly erroneous.
The trial judge found that the officer checked out
whether Jose Cruz had a license based on the officer's thoughts that
the driver of the vehicle might be involved in drug activity and his
desire to investigate for drug activity.

T. 35-6.

In addition, the trial judge found that using an
incorrect name for someone who is driving is an easy way to
investigate someone for drug activity where an officer wants to do
such an investigation.

T. 36. As the majority acknowledges, the

subjective intent of the officer is an appropriate circumstance to
be assessed in considering the totality of the circumstances.
Lopez. slip op. at 12.
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The testimony established that the officer recognized the
car as being in the vicinity of bars where drug activity occurred
(T. 8, 17, 18) and that the officer was near the bars when he first
saw the vehicle (T. 19, 22). The officer was parked at night in an
alley south of 600 South when he first saw the car.

T. 19, 22.

According to the officer, the car moved only about a half block to
700 South before the officer ran a driver's license check, made the
decision to pull the car over, and pulled in behind it.

T. 19, 21.

The officer had already made his decision to pull the car over and
was after the car when he pulled in behind the car prior to its
making the turn.

T. 19.

It was at that time, after he was already

after Mr. Lopez, that the officer claimed that a signal violation
occurred.

T. 19.
The trial judge's findings coupled with the evidence

support the trial judge's determination that the stop was a
pretext.

The officer was not able to make a reasonable

identification of Mr. Lopez as Jose Cruz, and a reasonable officer
under the circumstances would not have stopped Mr. Lopez but for the
desire to investigate drug activity.
The only area in which the trial judge did not make
explicit findings involves the impact of the claimed turn signal
violation—whether the officer was actually in a position to see
such a violation, whether Mr. Lopez actually failed to signal, and
if a violation occurred, whether it was the type of minor traffic
violation that a reasonable officer would not have made but for his
desire to investigate drug activity.

- 4

However, the officer testified

-

that he was already after Mr. Lopez to effectuate a stop and that
the claimed turn signal violation was not the basis for the stop.
In light of the trial judge's ruling, it cannot be
assumed that the trial judge found that the officer's testimony
about the alleged turn signal violation was accurate.
The Lopez majority indicates that this case falls within
the class of pretext cases in which Ma minor traffic violation or
the vehicle had a minor equipment problem, but where the court
concludes that a reasonable police officer would not have stopped
the vehicle absent the unconstitutional motivation.11
slip op. at 5.

Lopez.

The reason for this classification is the perception

that "defendant does not dispute that he failed to signal before
turning in violation of Utah law."

Id.

On the contrary—Mr. Lopez's motion to suppress
explicitly states, "there was no reasonable suspicion based on
objective facts to believe that the Defendant was committing or had
coiamitted a public offense at the time he was stopped and questioned
by the officer(s) and . . . the stop was a pretext stop to conduct a
fishing expedition type search."

R. 19. Mr. Lopez's brief also

argues that Officer Hamner was not credible and that it may well be
that Officer Hamner, like the officers in Sierra and Arroyo,
fabricated the alleged traffic offenses to justify the traffic
stop.

Respondent's brief at 34.
Both Lopez opinions repeatedly note that the evidence all

came from the testimony of Officer Hamner.

Both opinions indicate

that there is nothing reflecting that the trial court detected a
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lack of credibility in his testimony, and both opinions state the
facts as if Officer Hamner's testimony were accurate about
Mr. Lopez's alleged failure to signal before turning and about
Officer Hamner's alleged perception that Mr. Lopez was the
unlicensed Jose Cruz.

Lopez, slip op. at 1-2, 11 and n.12, 19, 21

n.2, 27.
The fact that all of the evidence came from Hamner is
irrelevant; in most pretext cases, all of the evidence comes from
the testimony of officers involved in the stop and the trial judge
makes findings based on that testimony.

In addition, although the

trial court did not explicitly find that the officer was not telling
the truth, the determination that the officer's belief that the
driver was Jose Cruz was incorrect and unreasonable includes an
implicit determination that at least portions of the officer's
testimony are not credible.

Credibility is not just an assessment

that the witness is intentionally not telling the truth; it also
involves an assessment of the foundation for the testimony, the
witness' ability to perceive, and the reliability of the testimony.
Mr. Lopez respectfully requests that this Court
reconsider its assessment of the trial judge's findings and affirm
the trial judge's order based on an assumption that the trial judge
made factual findings in accordance with his decision.

- 6

-

POINT II. THE BURDEN OF PROOF MUST REMAIN ON
THE STATE.
The majority Lopez opinion sets forth the following
burden of proof rules to apply in pretext cases:
[T]he State first has the burden to show the
warrantless traffic stop is lawful. Thus, the
State must establish that a traffic violation
occurred in the officer's presence or that the
officer had probable cause or a reasonable
suspicion to believe that a traffic violation
had occurred. Once the State makes this
showing, the defendant must put forth some
evidence to support the defendant's claim that
the stop was a pretext stop. Cf. Marshall, 791
P.2d at 886 (Party with burden of pleading
affirmative defense has burden of going forward
with evidence sufficient to raise issue).
If the defendant sufficiently raises
the pretext issue, the burden of proof is then
ultimately upon the State to show that a
reasonable officer would have made the stop
absent the alleged illegal motivation. See,
e.g., Mann, 712 P.2d at 10 (State must show
valid legal basis for stop and within exception
to warrant rule); see also Arroyo, 796 P.2d at
687-688 (in consent setting, State has burden
of showing consent was voluntary).
Lopez, slip op. at 15 (citation omitted; emphasis added).
The cases cited by this Court in support of its
imposition of this shifting burden of proof in pretext cases do not
utilize the burden articulated in Lopez, slip op. at 15-16.
In State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 887 (Utah 1990), this
Court required "as part of the State's burden to establish the
constitutionality of a warrantless search, [the State] must give a
defendant 'notice that he will be put to his proof' on the fourth
amendment issue of standing."

After the State has given a defendant
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such notice, the defendant must present facts which show that he has
standing.
Requiring a defendant to demonstrate that he or she has
an expectation of privacy is distinct from requiring an individual
to demonstrate pretext since standing is a threshold issue which
must be met before the fourth amendment is implicated, and the
information required is in the defendant's possession.
By contrast, in a pretext case, the threshold issue of
standing has been met and an individual's fourth amendment rights
are clearly implicated.

In addition, the information that this

Court requires a defendant to present in a pretext case is in the
hands of the State, not the defendant.
The only case cited by this Court in the burden of proof
section which even arguably supports the imposition of this type of
shifting burden is State v. Mannf 712 P.2d 6, 9 (N.M. App. 1985).
In Mann, the New Mexico Court of Appeals stated:
Once a defendant puts in issue facts alleging
that law enforcement officers stopped his
vehicle on pretext and conducted a warrantless
search and seizure, the state has the burden of
coming forward with the evidence to show that
there was a valid legal basis for the stop and
that the search and seizure came within the
ambit of a recognized exception to the search
warrant requirements imposed by the fourth
amendment•
(emphasis added).
Although, on the surface, it could be argued that this
language suggests that the defendant must put on evidence to support
his claim of pretext, when viewed closely, it appears that the Mann
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court is actually saying that once a defendant raises the pretext
issue ("puts in issue facts11), the State has the burden.
In addition, the burden of proof in a warrantless search
is not comparable to that of an affirmative defense.

See Lopez,

slip op. at 15. An affirmative defense is a statutorily created
defense which provides a defendant with a means of absolving himself
of responsibility.

The evidence of the affirmative defense is

generally accessible to the defendant.
In the face of an affirmative defense, the State must
nevertheless establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime was
committed.

By contrast, a pretext stop is a fourth amendment

violation; the well established rule is that the State has the
burden of establishing the propriety of a warrantless seizure.
The burden of proof articulated in Lopez is a higher
standard, placing greater burdens on a criminal defendant, than the
burden utilized in federal pretext cases.

See, e.g., United

States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 1988).
The shifting burden is also an unworkable burden which
will cause confusion in the trial courts.

Lopez instructs trial

courts that defendants must "put forth some evidence to support the
defendant's claim that the stop was pretext."
15.

Lopez, slip op. at

It is unclear, however, whether such evidence must be put forth

after the judge rules on the existence of reasonable suspicion,
whether it can be put forth through cross-examination of the police
officers, or whether the defendant must call his or her own
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witnesses•
Rarely, if ever, does evidence of a pretext come from the
defendant or any witness other than the officers who made the stop.
See generally State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 1988);
State v. Arroyo. 796 P.2d 684 (Utah App. 1990).

Furthermore, such

evidence is generally presented by the State in response to a
defendant's motion to suppress evidence based on the officer's lack
of a reasonable articulable suspicion to justify the detention.
Id.

Nevertheless, under the Lopez opinion, a defendant apparently

must now put forth evidence which may have already been presented by
the State's witnesses during the reasonable suspicion testimony and
to which he does not have access.
Although evidence of pretext is certainly needed to
establish a pretext stop, the party which puts forth the evidence is
not determinative.

Since a pretext analysis is based on the

totality of circumstances, shifting burdens and a focus on who
produces the evidence are irrelevant.

Instead of focusing on

whether a defendant puts forth evidence, the trial judge should look
to the totality of circumstances, regardless of who presents the
evidence, to determine whether a pretext stop occurred.

See

State v. Arroyo. 770 P.2d 153, 155 (Utah App. 1989), overruled on
other grounds. State v. Arroyo. 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990)).
The application of the burden of proof in pretext cases
is further confused by the last two sentences in the burden of proof
section in the majority opinion.
The defendant then may rebut the State's
showing by identifying facts and circumstances
- 10 -

of the stop that demonstrate a reasonable
officer would not have made the traffic stop
absent the motivation. A defendant might also
rebut the State's evidence by introducing
evidence that other officers normally do not
5top vqtiipj.es foy the same infraptjops py that
stopping for such infractions is at odds with
departmental policy or practice.
Slip op. at 16 (emphasis added)•
First, a pretext analysis requires a review of the
totality of circumstances; it is not an analysis which involves
"rebutting" the testimony of the State.

Second, the first sentence

suggests that "identifying" or arguing a pretext analysis is
sufficient to raise the issue.

This contrasts with the requirement

earlier in the opinion that a defendant "put forth" evidence.
Finally, the second sentence quoted above suggests that the
defendant put on evidence which is exclusively in the control of the
State.

This contradicts the acknowledgment in footnote 17 that the

State has the burden of proof because it is more likely to have
access to the officer's testimony.
Although the majority acknowledges that the State has
access to the information and therefore has the ultimate burden (see
Lopez. slip op. at 15 n.17), the need for the State to carry this
ultimate burden never arises under Lopez unless the defendant
presents the evidence to which the State has the natural access.
Under the shifting burdens outlined in Lopez, the
defendant carries the heaviest burden to initially introduce
evidence which is in the custody of the State.

This is inconsistent

with well established law that the State has the burden to justify
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warrantless seizures.

See, e.g.. Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 687.

Mr. Lopez respectfully requests that this Court
reconsider the imposition of this shifting burden of proof.

POINT III. THE ROLE OF SUBJECTIVE INTENT NEEDS
CLARIFICATION.
Portions of the majority decision in Lopez concerning the
role of subjective intent are inconsistent with this Court's
treatment of the trial judge's utilization of the subjective intent
evidence.

The majority appears to be saying that pretext stops must

be analyzed under an objective standard, but the subjective intent
of the officer is nevertheless a relevant piece of evidence which
figures into the objective assessment of the totality of
circumstances.

Lopez, slip op. at 12-14.

Despite this acknowledgement that evidence of subjective
intent is a relevant aspect of the totality of circumstances, the
majority determines that the trial judge "erred in focusing on
Officer Hamner's subjective state of mind in determining the
officer's stop was a pretext."

Lopez, slip op. at 11.

A review of the trial judge's findings and conclusions
demonstrates that he made an objective analysis.

However, one of

the circumstances he considered was the subjective intent of the
officer.

Such an approach appears entirely consistent with what a

portion of the Lopez opinion conveys—that the trial judge must
utilize an objective standard in assessing whether a pretext stop
occurred, but the subjective intent of the officer is a relevant
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circumstance.

See Lopez. slip op. at 12, n.14.

Initially, the majority states that the officer's
subjective intent is "not the relevant inquiry" and not a "key
factor."

Lopez at 9.

Then, the majority indicates that the

officer's subjective intent is a relevant factor in the objective
assessment of all facts and circumstances in the reasonable
hypothetical officer scenario.

Lopez at 12 and n.14.

Next, in footnotes 15 and 16, the majority cites with
approval three cases which appear to turn on the officers'
subjective intent, or "illegal motivation."

Finally, in

footnote 18, the majority explains that while the pretext doctrine
is difficult to apply, it is appropriately considered only in rare
cases, some of "which often involve a clear admission by the officer
that the stop was not made for the cited violation but because of a
hunch that a more serious criminal activity was involved" (emphasis
added)•
In short, in pretext cases, the subjective intent of the
officer is one critical factor among many in the application of the
reasonable hypothetical officer test.

Or, in the words of Lopez,

"The fundamental rule is that a trial court may look to all facts
and circumstances surrounding the traffic stop to determine if a
reasonable officer would have made the stop absent the illegal
motivation."

Lopez at 12 (emphasis by the court deleted, emphasis

added by counsel).

This Court misapplied the law in determining

that the trial judge erred in focusing on this piece of evidence in
reaching his conclusion.

- 13 -

CONCLUSION
Mr. Lopez respectfully requests that this Court rehear
the issues set forth herein.
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OPINION
(For Publication)

S t a t e of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.

Case No. 900484-CA

Gerard Cotero J. Lopez,
FILED
(March 2 , 1992)

Defendant and Appellee.

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable David S. Young
Attorneys:

R. Paul Van Dam and David B. Thompson, Salt Lake
City, for Appellant
James A. Valdez and Elizabeth Holbrook, Salt Lake
City, for Appellee

Before Judges Billings, Orme, and Russon.
BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge:
The State of Utah filed this interlocutory appeal from an
order granting defendant Gerard Lopez's motion to suppress
evidence obtained as a result of a police traffic stop and
subsequent inventory search of defendant's vehicle. On appeal,
the State argues the trial court erred in: (1) determining the
police officer did not have a reasonable suspicion to believe the
driver was driving without a license, and (2) determining the
stop was a pretext stop. We reverse and remand.
I.

FACTS

The question of whether a warrantless police traffic stop
violates the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
is particularly fact sensitive and, thus, we review the
underlying facts of this case in detail. State v. Smith, 781
P.2d 879, 880 (Utah App. 1989); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972,
973 (Utah App. 1988), rev'd on other grounds. State v. Arroyo,
796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990). The arresting officer was the only
witness called during the suppression hearing, and the facts are
therefore largely based upon his testimony.

At 9:00 p.m. on June 19, 1990, Officer Hamner was patrolling
in his police car. Officer Hamner saw defendant's vehicle
traveling southbound on 400 East in Salt Lake City, and
recognized the vehicle as one he had seen on several occasions
near two local bars known for criminal activity, including
illegal drug use. Officer Hamner believed the vehicle belonged
to Jose Cruz, and after observing the driver of the car, believed
the driver was Cruz. Officer Hamner recognized Cruz from his
undercover operations in the area approximately nine months
earlier. During this period, individuals had pointed out Cruz to
Officer Hamner and indicated Cruz was a drug dealer. The
individual Officer Hamner believed to be Cruz had also introduced
himself to Officer Hamner. Further, Officer Hamner had seen
photographs of Cruz during his work with the Metro Narcotics
Strike Force.
Because Cruz did not have a valid driver's license nine
months earlier, Officer Hamner called police dispatch to see if
Cruz had a license. The radio operator informed Officer Hamner
that there was no record of Jose Cruz having a driver's license.
Officer Hamner then observed defendant turn onto 700 South
without signaling. Officer Hamner pulled defendant over and
asked to see his driver's license. Although Officer Hamner
admitted he suspected defendant had been involved with drugs, he
testified that he stopped defendant for driving without a license
and failing to signal. Defendant was unable to produce a
driver's license but did give Officer Hamner an identification
card indicating he was "Geraldo Lopez." Officer Hamner then did
a warrants check on defendant under the name of Lopez which
revealed three outstanding warrants. Officer Hamner placed
defendant under arrest and cited defendant for driving without a
license and failing to signal before turning. Officer Hamner
impounded defendant's car and during an inventory search, he and
another officer discovered several bags of cocaine.
Defendant was charged with one count of unlawful possession
of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, a seconddegree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. section 58-378(1)(a)(iv) (Supp. 1990). Defendant filed a motion to suppress
the evidence seized during the search of his car. Relying on
this court's opinion in Sierra. 754 P.2d 972, the trial court
concluded Officer Hamner's stop of defendant was an
unconstitutional "pretext•• stop, and ordered the evidence seized
by Officer Hamner suppressed. Following the trial court's
suppression ruling, the State petitioned for interlocutory review
of the trial court's ruling, which we granted.

c nr\£?

£-r>z

II.

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND AUTOMOBILE STOPS

In considering a motion to suppress, we review a trial
court's underlying factual findings under a "clearly erroneous"
standard. State v. Smith. 781 P.2d at 881; Sierra, 754 P.2d at
974. However, we review the trial court's ultimate legal
conclusions flowing from these factual findings under a
"correctness" standard. State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215
(Utah App. 1991).
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
secures the right of individuals to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
U.S. Const, amend IV.1
The Fourth Amendment's protection from unreasonable searches
and seizures extends to automobiles. Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648, 653, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1396 (1979); State v. Schlosser,
774 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 1989); see State v. Grovier. 808 P.2d
133, 13 5 (Utah App. 1991). "The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
are implicated . . . because stopping an automobile and detaining
its occupants constitute a * seizure' within the meaning of those
Amendments, even though the purpose of the stop is limited and
the resulting detention quite brief." Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653,
99 S. Ct. at 1396. Thus, the Fourth Amendment prohibits police
officers from randomly or arbitrarily stopping vehicles on the
highway. See id. at 654-56, 99 S. Ct. at 1396-98. Among the
situations that courts have identified where a police officer is
1. Although on appeal defendant claims Officer Hamner violated
his rights under both the federal Constitution and Article I,
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution, defendant offers no argument
that our judgment or analysis should differ under these two
provisions. We thus limit our analysis to the Fourth Amendment
and make no comment concerning the search and seizure provisions
of the Utah Constitution and pretext stops. See generally State
v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 465 (Utah 1990)(plurality)(analyzing
Utah Constitution "search and seizure" provision where analysis
under federal Constitution may differ).
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justified in stopping a vehicle are: (1) When the officer
observes the driver commit a traffic violation; e.g., State v.
Smith. 781 P.2d at 882-83; Kehoe v. State. 521 So. 2d 1094, 109596 (Fla. 1988) ; (2) when the officer has a reasonable articulable
suspicion that the driver is committing a traffic offense, such
as driving under the influence of alcohol or driving without a
license; e.g.. Grovier, 808 P.2d at 135; State v. Baird, 763 P.2d
1214, 1216 (Utah App. 1988); and (3) when the officer has a
reasonable articulable suspicion that the driver is engaged in
more serious criminal activity, such as transporting drugs; e.g.,
United States v, Lvles, 946 F.2d 78, 81 (8th Cir. 1991); United
States v, Morgan. 936 F.2d 1561, 1567 (10th Cir. 1991); Sierra.
754 P.2d at 975.
The issues presented at the suppression hearing and now on
appeal pertain to the first two categories outlined above. The
State contends Officer Hamner was justified in stopping defendant
.because defendant had committed a traffic violation by failing to
signal before turning, and the officer had reason to believe
defendant was driving without a license. Alternatively, the
State argues the case should be remanded because of insufficient
findings under both these issues and because the trial court
incorrectly applied the pretext doctrine. We agree with the
State that the trial court applied the wrong legal standard when
holding Officer Hamner's traffic stop was a pretext stop. We
also agree that the court's findings of fact were inadequate with
regard to both the pretext stop and whether Officer Hamner had a
reasonable suspicion that defendant was driving without a
license. We therefore reverse and remand. Because we reverse
and remand for a fresh analysis of the legality of the traffic
stop, we do not reach the issue of the legality of the subsequent
detention.
III.
A.

PRETEXT TRAFFIC STOP

When the Pretext Doctrine Applies

In recent years, this court has joined other courts in
construing the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment2 by
adopting what we now commonly refer to as the "pretext doctrine."
See, e.g., Grovier, 808 P.2d at 135-37; State v. Marshall, 791
P.2d 880, 882-83 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah
2. We have never expressly considered whether the pretext
doctrine is also rooted in Article I, Section 14 of the Utah
Constitution. There is, however, no reason to believe at least
the same protections are not afforded under our state
constitution.
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1990); Baird, 763 P.2d at 1216-17; Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977-80;
see also United States v. Guzman. 864 F.2d 1512, 1518-19 (10th
Cir. 1988); United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 708 (11th Cir.
1986) ; sources cited in footnote eight. In Utah, the pretext
doctrine applies in cases where an officer claims to have stopped
a vehicle for a minor traffic violation, but where the court
determines the stop was not made because of the traffic violation
but rather due to an unconstitutional motivation and, therefore,
the officer has deviated from the normal course of action
expected of a reasonable officer.3 Sierra, 754 P.2d at 978.
We have articulated the pretext doctrine as whether a "reasonable
. . . officer, in view of the totality of the circumstances
confronting him or her, would have stopped" the vehicle for the
traffic violation absent the unconstitutional motivation. Id.
Whether a traffic stop was an unconstitutional "pretext"
stop requires a legal conclusion—thus we review it for
"correctness." Steward, 806 P.2d at 215; State v. Palmer, 803
P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah App. 1990), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241
(Utah 1991) .4
This court has utilized the "pretext" doctrine in two
distinct situations. First, we have applied it where the facts
demonstrated the driver did not commit a traffic violation.5
Baird, 763 P.2d at 1217; Sierra, 754 P.2d at 979. The second
situation is where the driver committed a minor traffic violation
or the vehicle had a minor equipment problem, but where the court
concludes that a reasonable police officer would not have stopped
the vehicle absent the unconstitutional motivation. See, e.g.,
State v. Smith, 781 P.2d at 883; Kehoe, 521 So. 2d at 1097.
Because defendant does not dispute that he failed to signal
before turning in violation of Utah law, we address the second
variation of the pretext doctrine, i.e., where a traffic
violation has occurred.

3. We have also referred to this standard as the "hypothetical
reasonable officer" standard. See Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977-78.
4. See generally State v. Vigil, 815 P.2d 1296, 1298-1301 (Utah
App. 1991)(discussing in some detail bifurcated standard of
review applied to mixed questions of fact and law in Fourth
Amendment context).
5. There is little question that under these circumstances a
traffic stop is unconstitutional. Judge Russon's dissenting
opinion would recognize such stops as unconstitutional.
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B.

Reasons for the Pretext Doctrine

Because Judge Russon in his dissent has chosen to follow the
State's plea that we abandon the pretext doctrine, we reexamine
the underlying policies that persuaded us to adopt the doctrine
in the first instance.6
The adoption of the pretext doctrine is consistent with
existing legal authority. Although the United States Supreme
Court has yet to address the pretext doctrine, a number of
federal circuit courts have approved the doctrine. See Guzman,
864 F.2d at 1515; United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d at 710-11.7
In 1990, the Utah Supreme Court, by implication, ratified our
application of the pretext doctrine in State v. Arrovo. 796 P.2d
684, 688 (Utah 1990). There, the Utah Supreme Court reached the
issue of whether a voluntary consent which occurred after a
pretextual traffic stop was sufficiently attenuated from the
prior illegal pretext stop to allow the consent to validate the
warrantless search. If the Arroyo court disapproved of the
pretext doctrine, logic suggests the court would have rejected
the doctrine and reversed this court without ever reaching the
attenuation-consent issue. In fact, the Arrovo court referred to
our pretext holding with approval:
[t]he court of appeals agreed [with the lower
court's pretext finding], stating that under
the totality of the circumstances, "a
reasonable officer would not have stopped
Arroyo and cited him for * following too
closely' except for some unarticulated
6. Apart from Judge Russon's dissent in this case, every other
judge on the Utah Court of Appeals has cited the pretext doctrine
with approval. See State v. Lovegren. 798 P.2d 767, 770 n.10
(Utah App. 1990)(Bench, Davidson, and Orme, J.J.); State v.
Smith, 781 P.2d at 883 (Bench, Billings, Orme, J.J.); State v.
Marshall. 791 P.2d 880, 883 (Utah App. 1990)(Billings, Davidson,
and Jackson, J.J.); State v. Arroyo. 770 P.2d 153, 154 (Utah App.
1989), rev'd on other grounds. 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990)
(Billings, Bench, and Garff, J.J.); State v. Talbot. 792 P.2d
489, 491-92 (Utah App. 1990)(Billings, Greenwood, and Orme,
J.J.); Sierra. 754 P.2d at 977-78 (Billings, Bench, and Jackson,
J.J.).
7. But see United States v. Trigg. 925 F.2d 1064, 1065 (7th
Cir.)(rejecting pretext doctrine), cert, denied sub nom.. Cummins
v. United States,
U.S.
, 112 S. Ct. 428 (1991); United
States v. Cummins, 920 F.2d 498, 500 (8th Cir. 1990)(same), cert,
denied,
U.S.
, 112 S. Ct. 428 (1991).
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suspicion of more serious criminal activity."
The trial court and the court of appeals were
clearly correct on [the pretext] issue—
Trooper Mangelson's stop was an
unconstitutional pretext.
Id. (emphasis added, citations omitted). Additionally, the
majority of other states which have considered the issue have
adopted the pretext doctrine.8
We are persuaded the pretext doctrine is necessary to
prevent the abuse of various exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's
warrant requirement. See United States v. Trigg, 878 F.2d 1037
(7th Cir. 1989) . Furthermore, the doctrine protects citizens
from arbitrary activity by police officers and supports the
Fourth Amendment's requirement of objective reasonableness to
support any invasion by law enforcement. See Maryland v. Macon,
472 U.S. 463, 470-71, 105 S. Ct. 2778, 2783 (1985); Scott v.
United States. 436 U.S. 128, 137-38, 98 S. Ct. 1717, 1723 (1978).
Finally, the pretext doctrine requires courts to focus on the
realities of police practices—not pretenses—thus protecting the
integrity of the courts. See United States v, Keller, 499 F.
Supp. 415, 418 (N.D. 111. 1980); Arrovo, 796 P.2d at 689.
There can be little dispute that in our society, minor
traffic and equipment violations are pervasive. See Sierra, 754
P.2d at 978-79 (quoting 5 W. Lafave, Search and Seizure § 5.2(e)
(2d ed. 1987)); Kehoe, 521 So. 2d at 1097. Allowing police
officers to stop vehicles for any minor violation when the
officer in fact is pursuing a hunch would allow officers to seize
almost any individual on the basis of otherwise unconstitutional
objectives. Such unfettered discretion offends the Fourth
Amendment. See Terrv v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S. Ct. 1868,
1879 (1968); United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d at 711.
Further, allowing police officers to make pretext stops
implicates equal protection concerns and policies. We cannot
ignore the reality that many pretext stop cases involve
minorities and that in some cases one of the articulated reasons
8. See New York v. Camarre, 171 A.D.2d 1002, 569 N.Y.S.2d 223,
224, appeal denied, 573 N.Y.S.2d 649, 578 N.E.2d 447 (1991);
Tarwid v. Georgia, 184 Ga. App. 853, 363 S.E.2d 63, 64-65 (App.
1987); Kehoe, 521 So. 2d at 1096; Illinois v. Guerrieri, 194 111.
App. 3d 497, 501, 551 N.E.2d 767, 770, appeal denied, 132 111. 2d
549, 555 N.E.2d 380 (1990); North Carolina v. Morocco, 99 N.C.
App. 421, 427, 393 S.E.2d 545, 548 (1990). But see State v,
Olaiz, 100 Or. App. 380, 786 P.2d 734, 736, appeal denied, 310
Or. 122, 794 P.2d 793 (1990)(rejecting pretext doctrine).
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for the stop was that the occupants were Hispanic.9 We are
mindful that law enforcement officials often use racial
characteristics as a basis for "hunch" criminal profiles in
pretextual traffic stops. Cf. United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d
at 711 (pretext stop occurring during officers use of drug
courier profile). Courts have consistently held these profiling
techniques unconstitutional where they are the sole basis for
making a traffic stop.10 To permit police officers to use any
minor traffic violation as a pretext to stop a vehicle encourages
the selective enforcement of traffic regulations against
minorities or "suspicious" classes, such as those with an
unorthodox appearance or out-of-state license plates.
Accordingly, in addition to Fourth Amendment concerns, equal
protection policies constrain us to uphold the pretext doctrine.
Our colleague in dissent criticizes the pretext doctrine,
claiming the doctrine invades the province of the legislature.
We disagree. The pretext doctrine does not restrict the state
legislature from enacting traffic regulations, nor does it
facially invalidate any traffic regulation. Rather, the pretext
9. Numerous federal and state cases dealing with a pretext stop
question have involved vehicle occupants of Hispanic or AfricanAmerican descent. See, e.g.. United States v. Ouinones-Sandoval.
943 F.2d 771, 774 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Rivera. 906
F.2d 319, 322 n.l (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Lavmon. 730
F. Supp. 332, 339 (D. Colo. 1990); United States v. Suarez. 694
F. Supp. 926, 931 (S.D. Ga. 1988), aff'd. 885 F.2d 1574 (11th
Cir. 1989); Arroyo. 796 P.2d at 687 n.3; Limonia v. Commonwealth,
7 Va. App. 416, 419, 375 S.E.2d 12, 13 (1988), on rehearing. 8
Va. App. 532, 383 S.E.2d 476 (1989), cert, denied.
U.S.
,
110 S. Ct. 1925 (1990).
10. See, e.g.. Lavmon. 730 F. Supp. at 339 (use of drug profile
to make traffic drug stop unconstitutional where evidence showed
stop was based on race of defendants); Lowrev v. Commonwealth. 9
Va. App. 314, 388 S.E.2d 265, 267 (1990)(defendants race
impermissible factor in traffic stop where driver matched drug
courier profile); see also State v. Shamblin. 763 P.2d 425, 428
(Utah App. 1988)(eschewing procedure that would permit selective
enforcement in favor of one that promotes "a certain equality of
treatment"); Comment, The Use of the Drug Courier Profile in
Traffic Stops: Valid Police Practice or Fourth Amendment
Violation?. 15 Ohio N.U.L. Rev. 593, passim (1988) (use of drug
courier profiles in making traffic stops may violate Fourth
Amendment); Note, The Drug Courier Profile and Airport Stops:
Reasonable Intrusions or Suspicionless Seizures?. 12 Nova L. Rev.
273, 295-96 (1987)(drug courier profiles are susceptible to
racial abuse and implicate Fourth Amendment concerns).
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doctrine restricts police discretion when used
unconstitutionally. Long ago the United States Supreme Court
recognized that a facially constitutional statute may become
unconstitutional when selectively and arbitrarily enforced on a
suspect class. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins. 118 U.S. 356, 6 S. Ct.
1064, 1073 (1886)(valid statute applied unconstitutionally where
evidence showed administrative body granted or denied statutory
licenses based on race of applicant).
Accordingly, we reaffirm our adoption of the pretext
doctrine. It protects the privacy of all individuals by
requiring that police be consistent in their enforcement of
traffic regulations and prevents police from conducting
warrantless searches and seizures based on an otherwise
insufficient hunch of more serious criminal activity.
C.

The Reasonable Officer Standard

On appeal, the State asserts the trial court improperly
focused on Officer Hamner's subjective state of mind in its
pretext analysis. We agree.
In Sierra, we stated a court should make an "objective
assessment of the officer's actions in light of the facts and
circumstances confronting [the officer] at the time." 754 P.2d
at 977. We emphasized that the proper inquiry is "whether a . .
. reasonable officer . . . would have stopped" the defendant
solely for commission of the traffic offense. Id. at 978; see
also Guzman. 864 F.2d at 1517; United States v. Smith. 799 F.2d
at 710-11; Kehoe, 521 So. 2d at 1097. "The proper inquiry does
not focus on whether the officer could validly have made the
stop." Sierra. 754 P.2d at 978.
Further, we clearly indicated that the officer's subjective
motivation is not the relevant inquiry. Id. at 977. Were the
officer's subjective motivation the key factor, a defendant could
use this improper motivation as an excuse to escape the
consequences of an otherwise valid and reasonable stop.11 The
Fourth Amendment's protection from unreasonable searches and
seizures is primarily grounded in protecting an individual's
reasonable expectation of privacy. See California v. Ciraolo.
476 U.S. 207, 211, 106 S. Ct. 1809, 1811 (1986). An individual
11. The reasonable officer standard is well entrenched as the
proper standard under the pretext doctrine. See Guzman. 864 F.2d
at 1515-16; Smith. 799 F.2d at 708; Kehoe, 521 So. 2d at 1096;
Grovier. 808 P.2d at 135; Baird. 763 P.2d at 1216; Marshall, 791
P.2d at 882-83; Sierra. 754 P.2d at 977-80.
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does not have a reasonable expectation that the police will not
make a traffic stop when the individual commits a traffic
violation the police regularly enforce. Thus, if a driver is
stopped for traveling at eighty miles an hour in a school zone or
running a red light—traffic offenses all drivers know the police
regularly enforce—the driver does not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy. In this circumstance, the driver should
not be able to avoid a stop simply because the police officer
also subjectively believed the driver might be transporting drugs
as such a stop is not "unexpected" or "arbitrary." See United
States v. Mendenhall. 446 U.S. 544, 553-54, 100 S. Ct. 1870
(1980).
Thus, the issue of whether a traffic stop is a pretext stop
cannot turn on the issue of an officer's subjective intent, but
rather, must turn on the objective question of whether a
reasonable officer would have made the stop under the same
circumstances absent the illegal motivation. Sierra, 754 P.2d at
977-78; United States v. Smith. 799 F.2d at 710-11; Kehoe, 521
So. 2d at 1097.
"[A] stop [i]s unreasonable not because the
officer secretly hope[s] to find evidence of
a greater offense, but because it [i]s clear
that an officer would have been uninterested
in pursuing the lesser offense absent that
hope." In other words, "the proper basis of
concern is not with why the officer deviated
from the usual practice in this case but
simply that he did deviate."
Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1517 (quoting United States v. Smith, 799
F.2d at 709 and 1 W. Lafave, Searches and Seizures § 1.4(e) at
94) .
Further, a focus on an individual officer's subjective
intent as the measure of whether a stop is a pretext would
violate the United States Supreme Court's ruling that the Fourth
Amendment mandates an objective inquiry into police activity.
Macon. 472 U.S. at 470-71, 105 S. Ct. at 2783; Scott, 436 U.S. at
137-38, 98 S. Ct. at 1223.
In making its suppression ruling, the trial court set forth
its findings of fact which included, inter alia, the following:
Officer Hamner observed defendant make a left
turn and says he did not see a signal at
which time a stop was made;
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xne underlying motivation for the stop was to
search for drugs and all conclusions as to
the identity of Mr. Lopez as Jose Cruz were
erroneous.
The trial court's conclusions of law included the following:
The underlying motivation [was] to follow and
to stop the search for drugs;
The stop was a "pretext stop" the subsequent
search of the car and seizure of the
contraband also violated Mr. Lopez's state
and federal constitutional rights against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
In its cursory findings and conclusions, the trial court
erred in focusing on Officer Hamner's subjective state of mind in
determining the officer's stop was a pretext stop. The court
also failed to address many relevant uncontested facts. The
officer testified he stopped defendant's car because he believed
defendant was Cruz, believed defendant was driving without a
license and because he saw defendant make a turn without
signaling. The officer further testified that he routinely
issues citations for failure to signal—writing about seven
tickets per month. He stated he always stops vehicles where he
believes the driver is driving without a license unless he is on
a high priority call. There was no contrary evidence as to what
Officer Hamner routinely did, nor any evidence suggesting that
what he routinely did was at odds with what a reasonable officer
would do. The court further did not comment on the officer's
credibility as to his claimed reasons for the stop in this
instance. The court's only relevant findings were that the
driver made a turn without signaling and "the underlying
motivation for the stop was to search for drugs." The trial
court incorrectly focused on the officer's subjective motivation
while ignoring whether the officer would have made the stop
regardless of that motivation. Accordingly, we reverse the trial
court's determination that the stop was a pretext stop and remand
the case for the trial court to apply the proper legal standard
and to make relevant findings of fact necessary to apply that
standard.n
12. The facts in the record are undisputed as only Officer
Hamner testified. The trial court intimated nothing which would
suggest the court found the testimony not credible. In such
situations, this court would ordinarily apply the undisputed
facts and determine the proper result without the need for
remand. See. e.q,t Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767, 771 & n.10. We
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D.

Relevant Evidence

Because we are remanding the case for a further evaluation
under the reasonable officer standard, we comment on the type of
evidence that is relevant to determine what a reasonable officer
would do under the same circumstances.13 The fundamental rule is
that a trial court may look to all facts and circumstances
surrounding the traffic stop to determine if a reasonable officer
would have made the stop absent the illegal motivation. See,
e.g. Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 688; Sierra, 754 P.2d at 978.
Although the pretext question does not turn on the arresting
officer's subjective motivation, a trial court may consider the
officer's testimony as to why the officer stopped the car and
whether such stop is consistent with his usual practice. Also
relevant are the objective facts and circumstances preceding the
stop. The involved officer's actions are neither irrelevant nor
-determinative as to what a reasonable officer would do under the
circumstances.M

refrain from doing so here because the scope of the evidentiary
hearing and its focus on Officer Hamner's subjective motives were
products of confusion as to the proper analysis under the pretext
doctrine—which we hope is clarified by this opinion. Therefore,
we remand to allow the opportunity for the introduction of
additional evidence, if necessary, and to allow the necessary
findings for application of the pretext doctrine.
13. On appeal, the State points out that several of our prior
opinions may be confusing to practitioners and courts attempting
to apply the standard, and has requested that we clarify what
evidence is relevant to a pretext inquiry to assist the trial
court on remand.
14. Although we have previously stated an officer's subjective
motivation is irrelevant, Sierra. 754 P.2d at 977, this statement
does not preclude introduction of evidence relating to an
officer's reason for the stop during a suppression hearing. In
Sierra, this court correctly observed an officer's subjective
intent is not the relevant legal standard or inquiry a court
should use to determine if a stop is pretextual in violation of
the Fourth Amendment. However, this statement was not made in
the context of what evidence may be relevant to what a reasonable
officer would do under the circumstances. Thus, Sierra does not
require courts to exclude evidence of an officer's subjective
intent. It merely establishes the pretext doctrine as an
objective legal standard.

In United States v. Smith, the court explained:
In determining the validity of the stop of
[defendants] automobile by [the officer], we
therefore are not concerned with [the
officer's] subjective intent. His actions
and his description of the circumstances
surrounding the stop are, however, relevant
to our inquiry. Thus, while [the officer's]
courtroom declaration of motive is
intriguing, what turns this case is the
overwhelming objective evidence that [the
officer] had no interest in investigating
possible drunk driving charges: he began
pursuit before he observed any "weaving" and,
even after he stopped the car, he made no
investigation of the possibility of
intoxication. That he described the vehicle
as being driven with an abundance of caution
further indicates that the stop was unrelated
to any possible concern with traffic safety.
Based on this objective evidence, we conclude
that a reasonable officer would not have
stopped the car absent an additional, invalid
purpose.
799 F.2d at 710-11.
This court has repeatedly looked to the circumstances
surrounding the stop in deciding whether the officer involved
would have stopped the car for the traffic violation absent the
unconstitutional motivation. The evidence is not determinative—
as the relevant legal inquiry is whether a reasonable officer
would have stopped the vehicle absent the unconstitutional
motivation. However, the evidence is probative of the inquiry as
the officer involved is within the class of competent witnesses.
Sierra, 754 P.2d at 979-80.l5 Utah courts have never excluded
15. In Sierra we said "[o]ur conclusion that a reasonable
officer would not have stopped Sierra for traveling in the left
lane is buttressed by the events preceding [the officer's]
seizure of Sierra's automobile. . . . Officer Smith was
suspicious of Sierra before he observed Sierra commit any
purported traffic violation. He had radioed for a computer check
of the car's license plate but found it was not stolen.
Nevertheless, he radioed for back-up assistance and exceeded the
posted speed limit to catch Sierra." Sierra. 754 P.2d at 979-80;
see also Arroyo. 796 P.2d at 687 n.3 (Trooper Mangelson did not
stop Arroyo until he pulled along side and observed the occupants
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evidence of the involved officer's expressed reason for the stop
nor the facts and circumstances surrounding the stop in
evaluating the reasonable officer standard.16 Certainly the
conduct of the officer involved is some evidence of what the
objective reasonable officer would have done, especially if it is
coupled with an indication by the officer as to whether the
conduct is consistent at least with his own practice. Simply
put, if an officer testifies to routinely making stops for a
particular offense, it tends to show the stop was objectively
reasonable; if the officer admits to having never before stopped
a driver for the offense, it tends to show a reasonable officer
would not have made the stop.
In addition to evaluating the facts and circumstances
surrounding the traffic stop, a trial court may also properly
consider evidence of the normal practices of other police
officers under similar circumstances, as well as indications of
departmental policy. The reasonable officer inquiry considers
all relevant facts and circumstances probative of whether a
reasonable officer would have made the traffic stop absent the
illegal motivation.

were Hispanic). In Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, we recognized that,
"unlike the officer in Sierra, [the officer here] was not
suspicious of [the defendant] for other reasons before the stop,
had not followed him in order to find some reason to pull him
over, and, before the alleged violation occurred, had not radioed
for help thereby indicating he intended to stop the vehicle."
Id. at 883.
16. The Utah Supreme Court in approving the pretext doctrine in
Arroyo also referred to the facts and circumstances surrounding
the stop and the officer's motivations. The Arrovo court stated:
[t]he following findings of fact justify the
conclusion the stop was a pretext:
"8. As a result [of] Trooper Mangelson's
training at [a] seminar, he admitted that
whenever he observed an Hispanic individual
driving a vehicle he wanted to stop the
vehicle. The Trooper also admitted that once
he stopped an Hispanic driver, 80% of the
time he requested permission to search the
vehicle."
Arrovo, 796 P.2d at 688 n.3.
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E.

Burden of Proof

Both the State and defendant seek a clarification of the
burden of going forward and the burden of proof in a pretext stop
suppression hearing. When a search or seizure is made without a
warrant, the burden is, in the first instance, upon the State to
show the warrantless search meets an exception to the warrant
rule. Id. at 886-87; New Mexico v. Mann. 103 N.M. 660, 712 P.2d
6, 10 (Ct. App. 1985), cert, denied. 103 N.M. 740, 713 P.2d 556
(1986).
In the pretext stop setting, this means the State first has
the burden to show the warrantless traffic stop is lawful. Thus,
the State must establish that a traffic violation occurred in the
officer's presence or that the officer had probable cause or a
reasonable suspicion to believe that a traffic violation had
occurred. Cf. United States v. Smith. 799 F.2d at 709 ("weaving11
not a violation of Florida law). Once the State makes this
showing, the defendant must put forth some evidence to support
the defendant's claim that the stop was a pretext stop. Cf.
Marshall. 791 P.2d at 886 (party with burden of pleading
affirmative defense has burden of going forward with evidence
sufficient to raise issue).
If the defendant sufficiently raises the pretext issue, the
burden of proof is then ultimately upon the State to show that a
reasonable officer would have made the stop absent the alleged
illegal motivation.17 See, e.g. . Mann. 712 P.2d at 10 (State
must show valid legal basis for stop and within exception to
warrant rule); see also Arroyo. 796 P.2d at 687-88 (in consent
setting, State has burden of showing consent was voluntary).
The State may easily meet its burden by introducing the
testimony of the arresting officers justifications for the
actual stop and the officer's normal practices. Absent some
17* The ultimate burden of proof is properly on the State for
several reasons. First, because the seizure was conducted
without a warrant, the State should bear the burden of showing
the stop was not an intrusion on the defendant's reasonable
expectation of privacy, including a showing of what a reasonable
officer would do under the same circumstances. See Arroyo, 796
P.2d at 695. Additionally, because the State has the primary
access to most of the relevant evidence, including the officer's
past stop practices and the practices of other officers, we
believe the burden of proof is properly placed on the State.
See, e.g., Staheli v. Farmers' Coop.. 655 P.2d 680, 683 (Utah
1982)(burden of proof lies with party most likely to have access
to evidence).
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concession that the stop was outside normal practice, this may be
all that is necessary. See, e.g.. Lovearen, 798 P.2d at 771.
The defendant then may rebut the State's showing by identifying
facts and circumstances of the stop that demonstrate a reasonable
officer would not have made the traffic stop absent the
unconstitutional motivation. A defendant might also rebut the
State's evidence by introducing evidence that other officers
normally do not stop vehicles for the same infractions or that
stopping for such infractions is at odds with departmental policy
or practice.18
IV.

INADEQUATE FINDINGS OF FACT ON REASONABLE SUSPICION

In addition to its pretext arguments, the State also argues
the trial court's findings of fact were inadequate as to whether
Officer Hamner had a reasonable suspicion that defendant was
driving without a license. We agree. Initially, we note that
the trial court's findings were very brief and did not set out
the circumstances of the stop of defendant's car. More
18. We concede that the pretext doctrine complicates matters for
trial counsel and trial courts. However, the effort is justified
by the important constitutional principles involved. See I.N.S.
v. Chadha. 462 U.S. 919, 944, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2781 (1983) ("the
fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and
useful in facilitating functions of government, standing alone,
will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution").
Furthermore, the doctrine will be rarely applied if properly
used. Only a small minority of traffic stop cases implicate the
pretext doctrine when the focus is on "whether a reasonable
officer would have made the stop absent the illegal motivation."
In clear-cut cases, as mentioned earlier, of driving eighty
miles-per-hour in a school zone or consuming alcohol while
driving, common knowledge suggests that reasonable officers
everywhere routinely stop such offenders. In such cases, the
pretext doctrine cannot be asserted in good faith and can be
dismissed quickly by trial judges.
The pretext doctrine has been applied only to the unusual
stop where discretion is broad, such as weaving or following too
closely or a minor equipment problem. The cases often involve a
clear admission by the officer that the stop was not made for the
cited violation but because of a hunch that more serious criminal
activity was involved. See, e.g., Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 688 and
n.3; Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977; see also State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d
181 (Utah 1987)("erratic" driving with police tailing
insufficient to support reasonable suspicion); Baird, 763 P.2d at
1217; Guzman. 864 F.2d at 1518; United States v. Smith. 799 F.2d
at 706.

C ^ C, L 7-

importantly, the findings do not clearly establish how Officer
Hamner arrived at the suspicion that defendant was driving
without a license, and are particularly confusing in describing
the relationship between Cruz and Lopez—including whether
Officer Hamner had ever been introduced to defendant under any
name. The trial court's only finding of fact with regard to this
issue stated: "[A]11 conclusions as to the identity of Mr. Lopez
as Jose Cruz were erroneous." With no other findings on the
relationship between Lopez and Cruz, we are unable to evaluate
whether the court's conclusion that there was no reasonable
suspicion to stop defendant for driving without a license was in
error. See State v. Lovecrren. 798 P.2d 767, 111 (Utah App.
1990). Accordingly, on remand, the trial court should more fully
explain the factual basis for its conclusion regarding reasonable
suspicion.
CONCLUSION
We reverse the trial court's conclusion that Officer
Hamner's stop of defendant for failing to signal was a pretext
stop on the ground that the trial court applied an improper legal
analysis under the pretext doctrine and therefore made inadequate
findings of fact. We also remand the case for further findings
of fact and conclusions of law concerning whether Officer Hamner
had a reasonable suspicion to believe defendant was driving
without a license.

Judith M. Billings,
Associate Presiding Judge

I CONCUR:

Gregor^K. Orme, Judged
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RUSSON, Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in part):
Although I concur that this case must be reversed and
remanded, I dissent (1) from the majority's analysis used in
reaching that result and (2) from the majority's instructions
upon remand that the trial court should reanalyze the evidence
and issue a revised order on Lopez's motion to suppress. I would
reverse and remand this case for trial in which the evidence in
question would be admitted.
On appeal, the State has invited us to reconsider the
pretext analysis first set forth in State v. Sierra. 754 P.2d 972
(Utah App. 1988), disavowed on other grounds. State v. Arrovo,
796 P.2d 684, 689-92 (Utah 1990). Upon that invitation, I would
recommend a return to the basic analysis of the legality of
seizures established in Terrv v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868
(1968), and Delaware v. Prouse. 440 U.S. 648, 99 S. Ct. 1391
(1979) for most traffic stop cases, limiting the use of Sierra to
the narrow group of cases to which pretext analysis properly
applies. Accordingly, I would hold that the following is the
proper, and more prudent, analysis.
I.

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND AUTOMOBILE STOPS

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
states that "the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .fl U.S.
Const, amend. IV. It follows that lf[a]lthough a person has a
lesser expectation of privacy in a car than in his or her home,
one does not lose the protection of the Fourth Amendment while in
an automobile." State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah
1989) (citation omitted). Thus, we have held that the stopping
of an automobile and the consequent detention of its occupants
constitutes a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment "even if the purpose of the stop is limited and the
resulting detention brief." State v. Steward. 806 P.2d 213, 215
(Utah App. 1991) (citation omitted).
However, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit all
seizures, but only unreasonable ones. Terrv v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1,
9, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1873 (1968). Under Terry, the determination
of whether a seizure is reasonable involves a two-pronged test:
(1) Was the police officer's action justified at its inception?,
and (2) Was the officer's action reasonably related in scope to
the circumstances which justified the interference in the first
place? Id., 392 U.S. at 19-20, 88 S. Ct. at 1879; accord State
v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah App. 1990).

As to the first prong, stopping an automobile is
constitutionally justified if the stop is (1) incident to a
lawful citation for a traffic violation, or (2) based upon a
reasonable and articulable suspicion that the defendant has
committed or is about to commit a crime. State v. Talbot. 792
P.2d 489, 491 (Utah App. 1990).l
In the case at bar, the first prong, whether the stop was
justified at its inception, is easily satisfied since making a
turn without signaling is prohibited by Utah Code Ann. § 41-669(1)(a) (1988), and driving without a license is prohibited by
Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-104 (Supp. 1991). M[A]s long as an officer
suspects the driver is violating *any one of the multitude of
applicable traffic and equipment regulations,' the police officer
may legally stop the vehicle." State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880,
883 n.3 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990)
(quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 660, 99 S. Ct. 1391,
1400 (1979)); accord Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109, 98
S. Ct. 330, 332 (1977); Talbot. 792 P.2d at 491. Therefore,
Officer Hamner's stop of Lopez's vehicle was clearly justified at
its inception.
However, Officer Hamner's actions must also be reasonably
related in scope to the stop of Lopez's vehicle for the
aforementioned traffic violations. This determination rests on
whether Officer Hamner was justified in running a warrants check
on Lopez without further evidence of criminal activity on Lopez's
part, an issue of first impression in Utah. Some guidance is
provided by the Supreme Court's decision in Michigan v. Summers,
452 U.S. 692, 101 S. Ct. 2587 (1981). In Summers, the Supreme
Court noted that an officer may communicate with others, either
police or private citizens, in order to confirm the
identification of the individual stopped or to determine whether
that individual is "otherwise wanted,11 unless such action makes
the period of detention unduly long. Id., 452 U.S. at 700-01
n.12, 101 S. Ct. at 2593 n.12 (quoting 3 LaFave, Search and
Seizure § 9.2, pp. 36-37 (1978)). As to the length of such
detention, the Supreme Court has held that the detention "must be
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the
purpose of the stop.11 Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103
S. Ct. 1319, 1325 (1983). Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court has
stated that the length and scope of a detention for a traffic
violation "must be * strictly tied to and justified by' the
1. Since Officer Hamner's stop of Lopez was based upon traffic
violations, whether Officer Hamner had reasonable suspicion to
believe that a more serious crime had been or was about to be
committed need not be examined. State v. Smith. 781 P.2d 879,
882 (Utah App. 1989).
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circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible." State
v. Johnson. 805 P.2d 761, 763 (Utah 1991) (quoting Terry, 392
U.S. at 19-20, 88 S. Ct. at 1879). Additionally, the Robinson
case states that M[a]n officer conducting a routine traffic stop
may request a driver's license and vehicle registration, conduct
a computer check, and issue a citation." Robinson, 797 P.2d at
435 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d
1512, 1519 (10th Cir. 1988)). While Robinson did not
specifically address the question of whether running a warrants
check exceeds the lawful basis for a traffic stop, conducting a
computer check most certainly can be read to include a warrants
check.
Moreover, other jurisdictions which have considered the very
question of conducting warrants checks during the course of a
traffic stop have held that such action is permissible so long as
it does not significantly extend the period of detention. See,
e.g., United States v. Contreras-Diaz, 575 F.2d 740, 744-45 (9th
Cir.), cert, denied, 439 U.S. 855, 99 S. Ct. 167 (1978); State v.
Ybarra, 156 Ariz. 275, 751 P.2d 591, 592 (1987); Storm v. State,
736 P.2d 1000, 1001-02 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987); State v. Nelson,
76 Or. App. 67, 708 P.2d 1153, 1155 (1985); State v. Smith, 73
Or. App. 287, 698 P.2d 973, 976 (1985) (citing State v. Perrv, 39
Or. App. 37, 42, 591 P.2d 379, 382 (1979); State v. Carter, 34
Or. App. 21, 32, 578 P.2d 790, 796-97 (1978), aff'd. 287 Or. 479,
600 P.2d 873 (1979)); Petty v. State, 696 S.W.2d 635, 638-39
(Tex. App. 1985); cf. United States v. Luckett, 484 F.2d 89, 9091 (9th Cir. 1973) (evidence inadmissible because running
warrants check extended detention beyond scope of original reason
for stop). I find this authority persuasive, and would adopt the
rule that running a warrants check in the course of a traffic
stop is permissible, so long as it does not significantly extend
the period of detention beyond that reasonably necessary to
effectuate the original purpose of the stop.
Applying this rule to the case at bar, I would hold that
since the warrants check was conducted within the course of
Officer Hamner's stop of Lopez for traffic violations, it did not
exceed the scope of that stop, and was therefore permissible.
Moreover, although Officer Hamner's attention was initially drawn
to Lopez's car for reasons other than those for which he stopped
Lopez, this "does not insulate the defendant from being stopped
for a traffic violation." State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 883
(Utah App. 1989) (citing State v. Tucker, 286 Or. 485, 595 P.2d
1364, 1368-70 (1979)). Accordingly, Officer Hamner's stop of
Lopez's vehicle was proper, and the subsequent seizure was valid.

II.

PRETEXT DOCTRINE

However, the majority's position that the test for pretext
established in State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 1988),
disavowed on other grounds, State v. Arrovo. 796 P.2d 684, 689-92
(Utah 1990), should be applied to the facts in this case must
also be addressed. The Sierra test for pretext in traffic stop
cases is based on the following language from Scott v. United
States, 436 U.S. 128, 98 S. Ct. 1717 (1978): "would the facts
available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the
search *warrant [an officer] of reasonable caution in the belief'
that the action taken was appropriate?" Sierra. 754 P.2d 972 at
977-78 (quoting Scott. 436 U.S. at 137, 98 S. Ct. at 1723).
Thus, the Sierra court reasoned that in traffic stop cases the
"focus [is] on whether a hypothetical reasonable officer, in view
of the totality of the circumstances confronting him or her,
would have stopped [the defendant] to issue a [citation]."
Sierra, 754 P.2d at 978 (emphasis in original).
I would decline to apply Sierra to the facts in this case
for several reasons.2 My initial concern centers on the fact
that the Scott test focuses on whether an officer's suspicion of
criminal activity is reasonable, a factor which cannot be readily
translated to apply in traffic stop cases. The Scott case
involved a determination of whether the officer had a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity in light of the facts known to him
at that time. Put differently, did the circumstances, viewed
objectively, justify the action taken? Scott. 436 U.S. at 13738, 98 S. Ct. at 1723. In traffic stop cases, however, that
question will always be answered in the affirmative since
issuance of a citation is always justified when the officer
2. Moreover, even if I agreed that the Sierra "reasonable
officer" test should be applied, I would nonetheless dissent from
the majority's determination that the case must be remanded for
reanalysis under Sierra and further factual findings. In State
v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), the Utah Supreme Court
recently reaffirmed that appellate courts in this state will
affirm the trial court "even when it fail[s] to make findings on
the record whenever it would be reasonable to assume that the
court actually made such findings." Jd. at 787-88 n.6. (citing
Mower v. McCarthy, 122 Utah 1, 6, 245 P.2d 224, 226 (1952)).
Since we have previously held that failing to signal before
turning "is the type of clear cut traffic violation for which
officers routinely stop citizens and issue citations," State v.
Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 883 (Utah App. 1989) (citations omitted),
even under the Sierra "reasonable officer" test, this court
should hold that Officer Hamner's stop of Lopez's vehicle was
not a pretext stop.
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observes a statute being violated. Police officers have a sworn
duty to enforce all laws passed by the legislature, including
traffic laws. Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-17 (1988) of the Motor
Vehicle Act provides:
The commission, and such officers and
inspectors of the department as it shall
designate, peace officers, state patrolmen,
and others duly authorized by the department
or by law shall have power and rt shall be
their duty:
(a) To enforce the provisions
of this act and of all other laws
regulating the registration or
operation of vehicles or the use of
the highways.
(b) To make arrests upon view
and without warrant for any
violation committed in their
presence of any of the provisions
of this act or other law regulating
the operation of vehicles or the
use of the highways.
(c) When on duty, upon
reasonable belief that any vehicle
is being operated in violation of
any provision of this act or of any
other law regulating the operation
of vehicles to require the driver
thereof to stop, exhibit his
driver's license and the
registration card issued for the
vehicles and submit to an
inspection of such vehicle, the
registration plates and
registration card thereon.
Id. (emphasis added). Thus, police officers do not have the
discretion to determine which laws would be reasonable to
enforce• Such action is appropriate whenever an officer suspects
that the driver is violating one of the applicable traffic
regulations. State v. Marshall. 791 P.2d 880, 883 n.3 (Utah
App.), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990); State v. Talbot,
792 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah App. 1990); accord State v. Sanders, 154
Ga. App. 305, 267 S.E.2d 906 (1980); Braxton v. State. 234 Md. 1,
197 A.2d 841 (1964); Anderson v. State. 444 P.2d 239 (Okla. Crim.
1968) .

r» r.r\ / c / -..'

Also, police officers cannot be expected, every time they
observe a violation of law, to make a legal decision whether or
not a "reasonable officer" would arrest the violator. In fact,
even those cases in which the Sierra test has been successfully
met do not establish a standard by which the State can prove that
a hypothetical reasonable officer would stop the vehicle. In one
case, the fact that the officer at hand often makes such arrests
was found to be relevant. See State v. Loveoren, 798 P.2d 767,
771 n.10 (Utah App. 1990). In another, the court determined that
the stop was justified based on the fact that other jurisdictions
had so held under similar circumstances. See Marshall, 791 P.2d
at 883. In a third, the trial court's decision that the
violation in question "is the type of clear cut traffic violation
for which officers routinely stop citizens and issue citations"
was sufficient. See State v. Smith. 781 P.2d 879, 883 (Utah App.
1989) . If the courts have not been able to articulate a standard
for determining what a hypothetical reasonable officer would do,
how can the police be expected to make on-the-spot judgments on
this difficult legal question?
Nor can the enforceability of state laws depend upon the
diligence by which police officers usually enforce such laws.
Otherwise, derelict officers would set the standard by which laws
would be enforced and thus limit diligent officers in performing
their duty. Although the majority proposes that the pretext
doctrine requires that police be consistent in their enforcement
of traffic regulations, just the opposite is true. To allow
police officers to decide which laws should or should not be
enforced would destroy the uniform application of laws throughout
the state, since what might appear reasonable to officers in one
part of the state might appear different to officers in other
parts of the state. Accordingly, while the stopping of a vehicle
merely to confirm or deny a "hunch," see Talbot. 792 P.2d at 49192 n.6, cannot be condoned, neither can it be left to police
officers to determine which traffic laws it would be reasonable
to enforce.
And finally, to hold that the police or the courts can
determine what laws are reasonable enough to enforce creates a
separation of powers problem. Although it is the judiciary's
responsibility to determine the constitutionality of the laws,
Dean v. Ramoton, 556 P.2d 205, 206-07 (Utah 1976) (citing Marbury
v. Madison. 1 Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803); State v. Betensen,
14 Utah 2d 121, 378 P.2d 669 (1963)), it is not within the
province of the executive branch or judicial branch to say
whether those laws are reasonable. Such is clearly an invasion
of the legislature's jurisdiction. ,f[I]t is not our prerogative
to question the wisdom, social desirability, or public policy
underlying a given statute. Those are matters left exclusively
to the legislature's judgment and determination." Condemarin v.
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University HOSP.. 775 P.2d 348, 377 (Utah 1989) (Hall, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted); accord Masich v. United States
Smelting. Ref. & Mining Co,. 113 Utah 101, 126-27, 191 P.2d 612,
625, appeal dismissed. 335 U.S. 866, 69 S. Ct. 138 (1948); Utah
Manufacturers' Ass'n v. Stewart. 82 Utah 198, 23 P.2d 229, 232
(1933) ("fairly debatable questions as to reasonableness, wisdom,
or propriety [of legislative action] are not for the courts, but
for the Legislature"). Thus, it is violative of the principle of
separation of powers to allow the police or the courts to
determine whether it is reasonable to enforce any law duly passed
by the legislature. Accordingly, Sierra should not be applied to
cases such as this.
Nonetheless, there are cases in which pretext is relevant
and must be considered. These cases differ from the case at bar
in one significant aspect: a finding by the trial court that
actually no violation occurred or that the stop was admittedly
made for reasons other than the traffic violation. Thus, in
cases such as State v. Arrovo. 796 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah 1990),
where no violation occurred, pretext can be thereby established
by the absence of a legitimate cause to stop the vehicle. Here,
however, the undisputed testimony of Officer Hamner is that Lopez
made a left turn without signaling and was driving without a
license. Compare id.; see also Talbot. 792 P.2d at 491-92
(pretext analysis used when no indication that defendants were
stopped for any traffic violation and where stop was in fact made
for other reasons); State v. Baird. 763 P.2d 1214, 1217 (Utah
App. 1988) (pretext analysis used where facts demonstrate that
the driver did not commit a traffic violation); Sierra, 754 P.2d
at 979 (pretext analysis used when no indication in record that
defendant had violated any traffic statutes).3
3. Similarly, a number of the pretext cases from other
jurisdictions that are cited by the majority involve situations
in which no traffic violation had occurred or where the stop was
admittedly made for reasons other than a traffic violation. See.
e.g., United States v. Smith. 799 F.2d 704, 706 (11th Cir. 1986)
(officer admitted that he did not stop the vehicle because it
"weaved," but because of his reliance on a "drug courier
profile"); Kehoe v. State. 521 So. 2d 1094, 1095 (Fla. 1988)
(officer admitted that he stopped the vehicle primarily because
he was told by another officer to do so, not because of a traffic
violation); Tarwid v. State. 184 Ga. App. 853, 363 S.E.2d 63, 6465 (1987) (officer admitted that at the time of the stop,
defendants were not committing any traffic violations). Others
involve stops which would have to be invalidated as exceeding the
scope under the two-prong Terry test analysis proposed herein.
See, e.g., United States v. Guzman. 864 F.2d 1512, 1514 (10th
(continued...)

Furthermore, Arrovo does not approve the Sierra "reasonable
officer" test, in the broad sense that the majority believes.
While the Utah Supreme Court did approve the court of appeals's
determination that the stop in that case was an unconstitutional
pretext, it did so on the basis of the following facts:
8. As a result [of] Trooper Mangelson's
training at [a] seminar, he admitted that
whenever he observed an Hispanic individual
driving a vehicle he wanted to stop the
vehicle. The Trooper also admitted that once
he stopped an Hispanic driver, 80% of the
time he requested permission to search the
vehicle.

14. Under cross-examination, the
Trooper denied that it was his normal
procedure when issuing a citation to an
individual for "Following too Close" to
record the license plate of the front car.
However, the Trooper's denial on this point
was contradicted by tape recorded testimony
from the Trooper at the preliminary hearing
held in this matter. The Trooper admitted
that he had not recorded the license plate
number of the front car in this case.
15. The Defendant testified that he was
at least 85 to 95 feet or nine car lengths,
behind the vehicle immediately in front of
his own. The Court finds this testimony to
be credible.
16. In contrast, the Court is
unpersuaded that Trooper Mangelson rightfully
determined that the Defendant was "Following
too Close" or that any other attested facts
3, (.••continued)
Cir. 1988) (rather than issuing a warning or citation, officer
conducted a further investigation admittedly to determine whether
defendants were "hauling contraband in the vehicle"); People v.
Camarre, 171 A.D.2d 1002, 569 N.Y.S.2d 223, 224, appeal denied.
573 N.Y.S.2d 649, 578 N.E.2d 447 (1991) ("What occurred was not a
traffic arrest, but a full-blown arrest based on suspicion of
drug activity, as evidenced by the fact that the defendant was
frisked and placed in handcuffs.").
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preponderated to the level necessary to
permit a constitutional stop of the
Defendant's vehicle. Moreover, the Court
finds that the Trooper's own testimony
established the probability that no violation
of law occurred, and that the alleged
violation was only a pretext asserted by the
Trooper to justify his stop of a vehicle with
out of state license plates and with
occupants of Latin origin.
Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 688 n.3. Thus, it is clear that the Utah
Supreme Court did not adopt the Sierra "reasonable officer" test,
but merely found that the evidence, including the trooper's
admissions, indicated that no traffic violation had occurred, and
based its conclusion that the stop was an unconstitutional
pretext on that indication.
Additionally, the majority's argument that the pretext
doctrine is beneficial because it restricts police discretion
when used unconstitutionally is also without merit. As noted
above, Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-17 (1988) of the Motor Vehicle Act
explicitly provides that whenever a police officer witnesses a
violation of any of the laws regulating the registration or
operation of vehicles or the use of the highways, he or she has
an affirmative duty to enforce that law. No police discretion is
provided for, and none can be read into the statute.
Accordingly, it makes little sense to argue that discretion is
being restricted where none, in fact, exists.
Nor does it follow that limiting the use of the pretext
doctrine will result in selective and arbitrary enforcement of
the traffic laws. If evidence of selective enforcement exists,
then the remedy, as in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S. Ct.
1064 (1886), is to hold that the statute, while facially
constitutional, was unconstitutionally applied. The solution is
not, as the majority suggests, to apply the pretext doctrine in
the name of restricting a nonexistent police discretion, but
instead to limit unconstitutional police action by returning to
the sound principles of Terrv v. Ohio and Delaware v. Prouse.
V.

CONCLUSION

The majority expresses its concern that the police will ride
roughshod over the citizenry if the Sierra doctrine is not
applied to cases such as this. I disagree. Sufficient
protection against unwarranted searches and seizures of
defendants can be achieved by the application of the two-pronged
Terrv test, which simply requires the answering of two questions:

-> c

(1) Was the police officer's action justified at its inception?,
and (2) Was the officer's action reasonably related in scope to
the circumstances which justified the interference in the first
place? Terrv v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879
(1968). The Terry test sufficiently limits the police officer's
actions in such cases to those within the scope and duration of
the original stop, in this case, to running a computer check,
which may include a driver's license check and/or warrants
search, and issuing a citation. Thus, the officer will not be
able to use the traffic stop as a springboard into further
investigation unless in the course of such a stop, a reasonable
suspicion, based on articulable facts, of criminal activity
arises, or the computer check reveals an arrest warrant. If the
computer check or other circumstances do not reveal a reason to
further detain the individual, the officer must simply issue the
citation and allow the individual to leave.
Thus, in the case at bar, I would conclude that Officer
Hamner's stop of Lopez for the traffic violation was proper, as
was the warrants check made within the duration of such stop, as
was the arrest based on the warrants, and that the subsequent
inventory search of Lopez's vehicle during impoundment and
seizure of the cocaine found therein was valid. Accordingly, the
trial court's order granting suppression of the evidence should
be reversed and remanded for trial in which the evidence should
be included.4

Leonard H. Russon, Judge

4. Lastly, I feel compelled to respond to footnote six of the
majority's opinion, wherein it states that all of the other
judges of the Utah Court of Appeals have cited the Sierra
doctrine with approval. Much of present-day law is based on the
wisdom of lone dissenters. Otherwise, the law would never
progressively improve. If such were not the case, Dred Scott v.
Sanford, 19 How. 393, 60 U.S. 393, 15 L. Ed. 691 (1857), would
still be good law, and Brown v. Board of Educ« of Tooeka. Kan,,
349 U.S. 294, 75 S. Ct. 753 (1955) might never have changed the
"separate but equal11 doctrine of Plessv v. Ferguson. 163 U.S.
537, 16 S. Ct. 1138 (1896).
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